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Introduction 
On February 25, 2012, Trayvon Martin, an unarmed 17 year old African-American 
teenager wearing a “hoodie” was shot and killed in Sanford, Florida as he walked to his father’s 
home from the store.  He was shot by a neighborhood watch captain, George Zimmerman, who 
had a confrontation with Martin after calling the police dispatch because he thought the youth 
looked suspicious. There had been a recent string of burglaries in the neighborhood, and 
Zimmerman has claimed that his actions were in self-defense because he felt threatened and 
Martin appeared to be “up to no good.”   Unfortunately, Zimmerman had not heeded the advice 
from the dispatch officer to avoid a confrontation.  Zimmerman’s claim of self-defense 
implicates Florida’s relatively recent “Stand Your Ground” law, a legal change that replaced the 
traditional retreat rule. 
 
The Trayvon Martin case is certainly a tragedy; if it is emblematic, it also represents a 
policy failure.1  That is our concern. The logic of this paper lies in four law-and-society 
propositions, ranging from general to specific (unfortunately, we cannot develop them 
completely here given space limits, but we can lay out the basics).  First, law orders interactions 
between participants by authorizing some behaviors and withholding legitimacy from others.  
That is, law structures who has authority to do what. Second, by assigning statuses and 
expectations to the roles in which the parties have, larger race-related norms about crime and 
deference can increase or decrease the likelihood of what Turk (1969) referred to as “normative 
legal conflict” during these interactions.  Third, Florida’s switch from a “retreat” rule in potential 
self-defense situations to a “Stand Your Ground” standard authorized different role expectations.  
And fourth, by extending Turk’s (1969) theory of normative legal conflict, we can understand 
why that policy change increases the probability of violence in interactions that implicate self-
defense.      
 
Conflict is inherent within authority relations.  Turk (1969), in particular, has focused 
attention on the interaction between legal norms and societal norms of deference to authority—
norms that go beyond those behaviors authorized by law.  Lanza Kaduce and Greenleaf (2000) 
have demonstrated that age and race dimensions of societal norms of deference here in the 
United States affect conflict between police and citizens in field encounters.  That finding fits 
with a broader research literature on Black typification of crime, or the extent to which 
individuals view crime as a predominantly Black phenomenon (Chiricos, Welch, & Gertz, 2004).  
Scholars continue to investigate how the social control of crime is influenced by extralegal 
factors (Eitle, D'Alessio, & Stolzenberg, 2002). We argue that official agents of social control 
are not alone in letting race factor into their decision-making about crime and criminality; 
citizens too will use race to help define the authority structure and determine the basis for 
treatment in small structured group interactions.  George Zimmerman, serving as citizen, 
acknowledged watch captain, and self-appointed guardian described Martin as “very suspicious.”  
Recall that Zimmerman had a history of reporting people who he deemed to look out of place.  
While any young man walking down the street alone in a hoodie may have been suspicious to 
some, we suggest that the American phenomenon of Black typification of crime amplifies the 
likelihood that a Black teenage male wearing a hoodie will be viewed as threatening.  
 
The Trayvon Martin case prompts us to explore features of authority, law, and racial 
implications of norms of deference and typification of crime in field encounters between citizens, 
at least one of whom is suspicious of the other’s activities.  Turk’s theory is primarily concerned 
with law enforcers.  The fact that Zimmerman was informally operating in that role on 
neighborhood patrol initially suggested the potential relevance of extending Turk to this analysis.  
This paper extends Turk’s theoretical framework on normative-legal conflict to interactions in 
which threat occurs.  The essential argument is premised on how the logic of “Stand Your 
Ground” restructures interactions; how it authorizes actions that previously were proscribed.  In 
other words, the new law extends legitimacy and gives authority to act in ways that were 
previously illegitimate.  The basic argument is that the traditional rule laid out a relatively clear 
expectation of retreat when feasible—a rule that minimized conflict—whereas the “Stand Your 
Ground” standard gives a new, but imprecise, status to citizens where expectations are less 
certain and are more dependent on subjective processes for assessing features of threat.  In this 
culture, we should not be surprised that those subjective calculations invite racial considerations.  
In particular, we argue that “Stand Your Ground” will increase overt conflict between parties, 
especially in cross-race interactions.  Rather than expanding self-protection, the new standard 
muddles statuses and role expectations and will lead to more conflict.  If our theorizing is 
correct, the Martin case will not be an isolated tragedy.  
 
The “Stand Your Ground” Law 
Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law was a legislative enactment to replace the common 
law retreat rule for self-defense. The common law approach had erected an expectation that a 
party to a threatening interaction occurring outside the home (or castle) leave or retreat from the 
situation when it was reasonable to do so.  In some ways, this was a “bright line” rule2 for 
citizens, most of whom were unschooled in the finer points of law.  They did not have to read the 
situation correctly in that they did not have to interpret the threat in terms of the legal 
“reasonable person” standard (i.e., whether a reasonable person would construe it as a threat).  
Subjectively, if they sensed threat (even for illegitimate racialized reasons) and could leave, they 
were to do so.  The legal obligation imposed in the interaction occurred at the onset—retreat if 
you can.  Conflict could be de-escalated because of flight, which was given priority over fight.   
Any legal questions about whether it was reasonable to perceive a threat or the degree of that 
threat (which would dictate the level of force that could be used in self-defense) were precluded 
because of the retreat.  Therefore, not only was the conflict in the interaction de-escalated, but 
the conflict over how to apply features of self-defense law was obviated.   
The “Stand Your Ground” legislation removed the retreat requirement outside the home 
and blurred the bright line for what citizens may or may not do for self-defense in interactions 
that present a level of threat.  The relevant section of the Florida statutes (FS 776.013(3) reads: 
  
 A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in any 
other place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat, and has the  
right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly  
force if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or  
great bodily harm to himself or herself or another to prevent the commission of a  
forcible felony. 
 
How “Stand Your Ground” Complicates Threatening Situations 
 
The “Stand Your Ground” standard now requires citizens to assess accurately four things 
from the perspective of a reasonable person (the objective standard) rather than from their own 
subjective read of events.  First, they need to make sure they are not engaged in an unlawful 
activity (so aggressive drunks at bars may have some grounds for concern).  Second, they need to 
interpret how a reasonable person would characterize whether an “attack” is unfolding.  Third, 
they need to assess from the perspective of the reasonable person the level of force that is 
warranted given the nature of the attack.  Fourth, citizens should consider that deadly force is 
authorized only if a reasonable person would conclude it was necessary to prevent death or great 
bodily harm and to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.  Florida statutes (FS 776.08) 
defines forcible felony as:” treason; murder; manslaughter; sexual battery; carjacking; home-
invasion robbery; robbery; burglary; arson; kidnapping; aggravated assault; aggravated battery; 
aggravated stalking; aircraft piracy; unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive 
device or bomb; and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or 
violence against any individual.”  In other words, the authorization of deadly force in self-
defense is legally prescribed.  It requires the citizen to accurately read the events in two ways: 
the citizen has to gauge the serious nature of the threat accurately and the citizen has to 
understand the legal distinctions for categories of felonies.      
 
There are two other legal complexities in Florida’s law that warrants attention. First, FS 
776.041 limits the use of force by a citizen who is an “aggressor.”  This applies to both people 
who may be attempting or committing or escaping from a crime that is a forcible felony and, 
more importantly for current purposes, to someone who initially provokes the use of force.   In 
other words, a citizen who approaches someone in a provocative way may be the initial assailant.  
In that scenario, the “aggressor” has a duty to retreat or to withdraw from physical contact, 
clearly communicating that intent.  Second, Florida law offers a kind of protection to those who 
assert “Stand Your Ground.”  The person is NOT to be arrested until the government has ample 
evidence to contradict the claim of self-defense.  Hence, Zimmerman was not arrested in the 
immediate wake of the shooting, despite the lead investigator’s desire to do so. 
 
The bottom line is that the old retreat rule precludes a cacophony of complexities in the 
interaction, legal complexities that give opportunities to explode under the “Stand Your Ground” 
standard.  The Trayvon Martin tragedy illustrates how much can go wrong in the interaction and 
how legal resolution itself becomes complicated—from police investigation and decisions about 
arrest (or not) to charging to pretrial hearings to trial.  What retreat would have precluded, “Stand 
Your Ground” confounds.       
 
Applying Turk and His Extension to “Stand Your Ground” 
Turk’s (1969) theory of normative-legal conflict lays out ways in which relationships are 
structured that hold different probabilities for lurking conflict between interacting parties to 
become overt.  Law can erect a kind of authority structure between those who interact that can 
alter that likelihood.  This is especially true in circumstances where citizens, like Mr. 
Zimmerman, have assumed the role of neighborhood protector. Unfortunately, “Stand Your 
Ground” increases the probability of violence.  
 
Sophistication of Interactants 
One of Turk’s arguments is that the level of sophistication that parties bring to the 
interaction can reduce conflict.  We argue that in simpler interactions, less sophistication is 
required than in more complex ones.   Therefore, conflict can also be reduced when law 
simplifies the structure of interactions (as in retreat rather than “Stand Your Ground”).  
 
The only subjective assessment under the traditional “retreat” rule dealt with a sense of 
threat and the ability to withdraw.  It is significant in the Trayvon Martin case that Zimmerman 
sensed enough threat of some kind to call dispatch, but that he did not heed the dispatcher’s 
advice to avoid an encounter, although he clearly could have.  There was an approach and a 
confrontation.  We cannot get into Mr. Zimmerman’s head, but we can infer from his behavior 
that he did not think he had to retreat, consistent with Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” standard.  
Because Mr. Zimmerman did not avail himself of retreat early on, the fit of the black letter law 
with unclear evidence makes it harder to resolve the case.  How did the confrontation occur?  
Did Mr. Zimmerman approach Trayvon Martin?  Was it threatening? Could Zimmerman have 
been perceived as an “aggressor”?  If so, would that have been a reasonable perception?  How 
did Trayvon Martin react?  Who used force first and what level of force was used?  How did it 
escalate to gunfire?   
 
The Trayvon Martin tragedy exposes a sad irony.  Were the police doing the law 
enforcing, there would have been better structure and checks to reduce the likelihood of gunfire.  
Police are trained in how to make approaches in the field.  They recognize legal distinctions 
between voluntary interactions, articulated grounds of suspicion for a brief detention under the 
Terry v. Ohio (1968) doctrine, and arrest situations.3  Police are screened to eliminate overt 
racists; they are trained in diversity; their field encounters are reviewed and supervised.  Police 
are trained in the use of force and have clear policy guidelines for it.  They understand that any 
use of their weapon will be reviewed.  None of these checks are in place with citizen enforcers.  
According to Turk’s analysis, police should have more sophistication in encounters than do 





Issues with Deference 
A second argument in Turk’s (1969) theory of normative-legal conflict is premised on 
deference to authority.  He argues that law structures interactions in ways that set up authority 
relationships and expects deference to those arrangements.  But law has to compete with larger 
social norms, and the expectations of law will be more likely to give way in some kinds of 
interactions.  Sometimes this will reduce conflict; in other circumstances it can increase conflict.  
Lanza Kaduce and Greenleaf showed that Black law enforcers (who have been given positional 
authority by law) are in weaker structural positions than are others because social norms are 
weaker in regard to deferring to minorities.  Lanza-Kaduce and Greenleaf found White citizens 
were less likely to defer to Black officers; the rate of conflict was higher in those cross-race 
structured interactions even after controlling for many other factors.   Conflict was lowest when 
the social norms of deference reinforced the positional authority of officers (i.e., White police 
officers had positional authority and social authorization but Black officers only had positional 
authority).   
 
Under the retreat rule, most subjective processes (including those regarding race) are 
precluded unless retreat is not feasible.  The retreat rule minimized subjective racial 
considerations because retreat was the formal expectation; under “Stand Your Ground” race can 
be incorporated into considerations of the nature of the threat, its projected degree of harm, and 
perceived benefits of using force.  How did the Zimmerman-Martin confrontation occur?  Did 
racial typification influence Mr. Zimmerman’s perception of suspicion and threat?  Did 
Zimmerman approach Trayvon Martin?  Did Zimmerman feel “authorized” to do so because of 
norms of deference (an older male expects a Black youth to defer)?    
 
We raise the question of how our cross-race norms of deference play out in interactions 
where threat is perceived by at least one of the parties.  Will those social norms increase what 
Turk refers to as “overt conflict?”  Should we expect enough Whites to perceive greater threats 
from young, Black males to increase violence in their interactions, especially now that the “Stand 
Your Ground” expectations have been formalized in law? Will the rate of violence be higher in 
some contexts?  To the extent that the  “Stand Your Ground” formal expectations reinforce 
traditional social norms about self-reliance and defense for some subgroups in the U.S. (e.g., 
males and Southerners) will we see the escalation of violence occurring disproportionately in 
some contexts (e.g., where Southern White males deal with young, Black males)? 
 
The Role of Racial Attitudes 
Scheingold (1984) has argued that the images of crime conveyed in a society may be as 
important to study as the actual pattern of crime.  Those images speak to the norms and social 
orientations of society at large and the individuals interacting in that society. Davis (2012) noted 
that by the late 1980s, media “accounts and political rhetoric began making crime synonymous 
with Black, and conversely Black synonymous with crime” (Chiricos, Hogan, & Gertz, 1997; 
Mears, Mancini, & Stewart, 2009).  Researchers observed a virtual crime news script in which 
the “criminalblackman” (Russell-Brown, 2009) was portrayed as a violent offender willing to 
victimize anyone within his reach (Mears & Stewart, 2010). This typification had been observed 
among law enforcers as well.  Skolnick (1966, p. 45-46) introduced the notion of the “symbolic 
assailant” as he tried to understand the “working personality” of police officers.  
 
The policeman, because his work requires him to be occupied continually 
with potential violence, develops a perceptual shorthand to identify  
certain kinds of people as symbolic assailants, that is as persons who use  
gesture, language, and attire that the policeman has come to recognize as  
a prelude to violence. This does not mean that violence by the symbolic  
assailant is necessarily predictable. … Like the animals of the experimental 
psychologist, the policeman finds the threat of random damage more  
compelling than predetermined and inevitable punishment.  
 
That accentuated concern lies at the heart of racial profiling in law enforcement.  There is no 
reason to think that profiling in citizen watches and patrols would be less salient.  Was Trayvon 
Martin a symbolic assailant to Zimmerman?  Will “Stand Your Ground” invite conflict? 
 
Black Typification of Crime 
Understanding the dimensions of threat is integral to a proper understanding of society’s 
social control mechanisms and both their intended and unintended outcomes.  As such, the Black 
typification of crime phenomenon is useful in analyzing the perceived threat posed by young 
Black males like Trayvon Martin to watch captains like George Zimmerman.  Black typification 
of crime describes the extent to which an individual views crime as a Black occurrence, i.e., how 
much a person equates participation in crime with being Black (Chiricos et al., 2004). Scholars 
have argued that Black  typification of crime is partially responsible for the punitive criminal 
justice policy that spread around the United States in the late 1980’s (Chiricos et al., 2004; 
Unnever & Cullen, 2007). We propose that Black typification of crime also “enables” vigilante-
style mindsets.  Did it factor into the events that led George Zimmerman to suspect, follow, and 
eventually shoot an unarmed young man?  If the retreat rule were law, would Zimmerman have 
felt less empowered to pursue Martin? 
 
Linking Black males with crime is nothing new. During the last three decades in 
particular, media accounts and political rhetoric have helped perpetuate the notion that crime is a 
Black problem (Chiricos et al., 1997; Mears et al., 2009). The “criminalblack man” then became 
the image of threat—the super predator (Russell-Brown, 2009). Thus, without doing anything to 
indicate criminality, Martin was a “criminalblack man.”  Turk (1969:100) anticipated this 
prospect,  
 
…criminal status may be ascribed to a person because of real or fancied  
attributes, because of what they are rather than what they do, and justified 
reference to real or imagined or fabricated behavior…; criminality is a  
definition applied by individuals with the power to do so, according to illegal  
and extra-legal, as well as legal criteria.  
 
While we cannot know the exact sequence of events that culminated in Martin’s shooting, we 
can raise questions.  Did Zimmerman see himself—and his neighborhood—as being under siege 
by Black males? 
 
Since the shooting, there has been much debate in the media about Zimmerman’s racial 
or ethnic status (e.g., he is half-Latino; he has African ancestry)—and thus his (in)ability to have 
racially stereotyped Martin.  However, any focus on Zimmerman’s minority status is 
theoretically misguided. The main concepts of symbolic racism theory (which will be discussed 
in a later section) and comparative conflict theory, among others, explicate the reasons all racial 
and ethnic groups will stereotype Black s in similar ways—including Black s themselves 
(Buckler & Unnever, 2008; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears, 1988; Sears & Henry, 2003).  
Zimmerman being a minority is of no consequence to his treatment of Martin, as belief in the 
“criminalblackman” transcends race and ethnicity. 
 
Threat 
Although the “criminalblackman” represents an intersection of threat types, the nature of 
threat can be diverse; it can be political, economic, racial, criminal, or some combination of all of 
these (Liska, 1992).  It has even been argued that these facets of threat are inextricably linked 
(Blalock, 1967).  Conflict theorists assert that racial/ethnic minorities, people with lower socio-
economic status, and youth are generally perceived as the greatest threats; Trayvon Martin was 
the convergence of all of these. Cultural norms can confound the notion of threat (indeed 
something that seems to have happened in the Martin tragedy). People and groups can 
misinterpret cultural signifiers of subordinate groups—in this case Blacks. Certain styles of 
dress, certain gestures, and even particular postures that are simply displays of African American 
cultural identity are often used as indicators of criminal threat (Armour, 2000).  It is therefore no 
wonder that the “appropriateness” or influence of Trayvon Martin’s hoodie (despite the fact that 
it was raining outside) has been the subject of so much debate.  Both sides of the political 
spectrum have been complicit in criminalizing Black cultural displays.  A popular example is of 
a liberal pundit who proclaimed that Trayvon Martin should have known better than to walk 
around at night in a hoodie (Daniels, 2012).  Comments like these are powerful on four different 
fronts.  In one sense, they are prime examples of the ubiquity of cultural threat.  Further, these 
kinds of comments demonstrate how Black men are not afforded the presumption of innocence.  
Similarly, these comments provide further breadth to the understanding of Black typification of 
crime. But perhaps most importantly, these comments expose the type of victim-blaming that has 
become characteristic of so many cross-racial tragedies with Black victims.   
 
With the “Stand Your Ground” law, a perception of an impending “attack” is almost the 
gateway to using force to defend one’s self.  Given the historical development and the current 
racial climate of the United States, what is calculated as a threat is likely to involve some anti-
Black sentiments (Armour, 2000; Kinder & Sears, 1996).  Be it the Black typification of crime or 
the conflation of African American culture with criminal threat, criminality is so strongly linked 
to Blackness that Zimmerman’s actions are not only consistent with  theoretical expectations but  
also common sense expectations.  Sadly, deadly repercussions can result from having legal 
permission to treat an individual as a criminal without due process. 
 
Symbolic Racism Theory 
Racism is often rendered invisible because it is so deeply engrained in social institutions 
and the consciousness of all people (Feagin et al., 2001; Unnever & Cullen, 2007). This 
inconspicuousness is the main premise behind symbolic racism theory (Kinder & Sears, 1981; 
Kinder & Sanders, 1996).   
 
Symbolic racism involves four primary concepts: 1) a belief that  
discrimination and prejudice no longer exists in any meaningful way;  
2) a belief that Black s’ failure to advance in society is because they are  
unwilling to work hard enough; 3) a belief that Black s are asking for  
too much too quickly; and 4) a belief that Black s have gotten more than  
they deserve (Sears & Henry, 2003; Henry & Sears, 2002).  Concisely,  
symbolic racism stems from an adherence to traditional American moral  
values and “anti-Black  affect” …  (Green, Staerkle, & Sears, 2006;  
Sears & Henry, 2003). One could say that symbolic racism fuses anti-Black   
affect with traditional moral values to conclude that Black s are culturally  
inferior rather than biologically inferior (Buckler et al., 2009). …  Anti- 
Black  affect has been described as a largely unconscious, nearly automatic 
 type of prejudice (Sears & Henry, 2003).  It often shows in the forms of  
fear, evasion, an embracement of separatism; disdain, discomfort; disgust,  
or perhaps just dislike (Sears, 1988 p70 taken from Sears & Henry, 2003; Davis, 
2012).    
 
The upshot of symbolic racism for “Stand Your Ground” is that cultural beliefs among many 
Americans not only militate against deference to Blacks but combine with strong negative 
emotions that include fear, disdain, discomfort—all cues relevant to the perception of threat and 
which may trigger the use of force, now seemingly authorized by a “neutral” “Stand Your 
Ground” law.  The theory posits that people maintain these beliefs while deluding themselves 
that they are “colorblind;” they think they act fairly and neutrally to all.  Despite denial, a symbol 
that often triggers the affect and reaction is the “criminalblackman” so that Whites and other 
nonwhite minorities (including Latinos) can share the cultural belief system (Buckler et al., 
2009).  In other words, the ethnicity of Zimmerman in the Trayvon Martin tragedy does not 
diminish the potential role of race in that case or in how “Stand Your Ground” will play out in 
threat contexts.  Symbolic racism predicts that Black s will be more likely viewed as threats—
they will more likely be symbolic assailants against whom force would more often be deemed 
necessary by the person who perceives threat but no longer has to retreat from it.  Symbolic 
racism posits that others’ cultural beliefs towards Black s may be non-deferential and even 
overtly conflict-oriented.     
 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
Lanza Kaduce and Greenleaf (2000) established that race is not the only cultural or social 
dimension at work in threat interactions.  Social norms about age and deference also matter. The 
young are not owed the same deference as are the older.  Lanza Kaduce and Greenleaf (2000) 
also raise the prospect of gender-linked norms.  In his exposition, Turk (1969) emphasized the 
importance of allowing both parties in a structured interaction to “save face,” to be able to de-
escalate the potential conflict and keep it from becoming overt.  One interesting feature of the 
retreat rule is that it obligated the party with the stronger legal standing (the person who was 
being threatened) to de-escalate.  It reinforced the social norm to avoid violence by giving it 
legal status.  In so doing retreat may have contradicted norms of masculinity, particularly values 
like “manning up” or standing up for oneself.  The gender-linked nature of norms of deference 
warrants study as well.  
 
 Keeping in line with Turk’s (1969) predictions, we suspect that the combination of 
Black, young, and male enhances the likelihood of perceived threat—they are the perceptual 
shorthand of the symbolic assailant.  Trayvon Martin in his hoodie exemplifies that image.  
When that profile is juxtaposed with a citizen, especially in an enforcement role, who is 
nonBlack, older (but not old) and male, we hypothesize that the likelihood of standing one’s  
ground and using force in the face of perceived threat goes up.  The combination is structural; we 
do not know which interactions will result in violence but we can predict that the rate of those 
interactions will be higher than interactions structured in different ways.  Theoretically, “Stand 
Your Ground” can be predicted to aggravate the structural arrangements in ways that will 
increase the rate of conflict over and beyond that produced by the retreat rule.   
 
 Policy is at its best when informed by theory, and we think even this brief theoretical 
critique provides reason to reconsider policies and practices.  We reject the notion that society 
has moved to a place of colorblindness and recognize that law can structure relations to make the 
role of race less likely to intrude (e.g., Merton [1949] reminded us that the behavior of fair-
weather liberals and timid bigots would change with civil rights laws.  Proposed legal changes 
and current legal practices should be examined through the prism of race given its role in this 
country.  Law can be structured to reduce the impact of racism.  The “Stand Your Ground” law 
allows racial typficiations to affect interactions with tragic consequences.  Florida’s legal 
structure compounds the problem when it gives “immunity” from immediate arrest to those who 
use force, especially lethal force, in interactions where retreat would have precluded the 
violence. We firmly support a retreat from “Stand Your Ground” and a return to the retreat 
standard.  We also remind the advocates of community involvement in crime control of the 
importance of sophistication, training, and screening in citizen participation.  Being Black is not 
cause for suspicion; being Black does not connote threat.  Seeing a “criminalblackman” is not 
sufficient to take the law into one’s own hands.   
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1 Since the Martin shooting, we have seen similar race-linked tragedies. 
2 The term is borrowed from court cases where justices are concerned with announcing clear, easily implemented 
procedures for police.   
3 Terry v. Ohio (1968) was a landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court which held that a police officer 
may briefly detain a suspect on the street and frisk him or her without probable cause to arrest, if the police officer 
has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime and has a 
reasonable belief that the person could be armed and dangerous.   
